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Abstract
The wide diﬀusion of NATs (and, in some respect, ﬁrewalls) may pre-
vent some applications that require direct end-to-end connectivity (e.g.,
real-time media) from being able to connect to the remote party. While
the solutions currently adopted rely on centralized nodes as third party
relays, the DISCOS architecture has been recently proposed and aims at
distributing such functionalities across a peer-to-peer overlay. The original
paper presented some performance characteristics of the overlay, but the
ability to resist to both failures and attacks was not taken into considera-
tion. This paper illustrates the robustness feature of the DISCOS overlay
and suggests some minor modiﬁcations to the original mechanisms, in or-
der to improve the overall robustness. The key component of DISCOS
is its dynamic scale-free topology. Hence, the paper also extends the ex-
isting literature concerning the robustness of scale-free networks, which
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considers only static graphs.
1 Introduction
The wide diﬀusion of Network Address Translators (NATs) and (in some respect)
ﬁrewalls deeply changed networks behavior, thus preventing some applications
that require direct end-to-end connectivity (e.g., real-time media) from being
able to connect to the remote party. Indeed when two nodes want to establish
a media session, both of them can be the initiator: if the session is started
by the node outside the network behind NAT, its establishment may fail. To
overcome this issue, ad-hoc NAT traversal techniques [1] have been developed.
These techniques aim at establishing communication across NATs between two
hosts. The hole punching [1] aims at establishing direct communication (i.e.
without intermediary servers) between nodes. For this technique to be eﬀective,
supporting nodes called rendezvous servers are needed during session establish-
ment. If hole punching fails, relaying [1] is used as alternative. This technique
consists in exchanging all the traﬃc through a centralized relay server. Due to
their centralized nature, both rendezvous servers and relays can be considered
as single points of failure: the media session fails if they become unavailable.
In addition, relays have to forward the traﬃc related to all the relayed sessions,
thus requiring a huge amount of computational resources, which represent an
additional scalability problem. DISCOS (DIStributed COnnectivity Service) [2],
which has been developed to overcome these issues, integrates rendezvous and
relaying functionalities directly into user nodes placed in the open Internet.
These nodes organize themselves into a peer-to-peer overlay to share the load
due to relayed sessions and to ensure quickly discovery of a rendezvous server or
relay when needed. Vice versa, the user nodes with limited connectivity (e.g.,
behind a NAT) do not participate in the overlay and must only be able to locate
an available rendezvous server or relay among the participating peers.
DISCOS has been deﬁned and validated through simulations in an environ-
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ment where media sessions are controlled using the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) [3]. Figure 1 shows such deployment scenario, where user nodes are called
User Agents according to the SIP terminology. To underline the double role
played by the nodes in the overlay, the peers have been marked as User Agents
and connectivity peers: as User Agents the nodes are ordinary nodes establishing
media sessions; as connectivity peers they are rendezvous and/or relays provid-
ing service to other user nodes with limited connectivity. [2] demonstrates that
the eﬀectiveness of DISCOS is due to its particular overlay topology. In fact,
connectivity peers organize themselves into a scale-free network [4], a topology
that can ensure eﬃcient resource lookups if properly exploited.
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Figure 1: DISCOS overlay topology.
Although an extensive literature (e.g., [520]) exists about the robustness
of P2P networks, either structured or unstructured, some peculiarities of DIS-
COS make this technology not completely covered by these studies. First of all,
in DISCOS nodes oﬀering the service (i.e., the connectivity peers) are equiva-
lent. Hence, a querying node is interested in locating one of the many available
connectivity peers in the shortest time, rather than in locating a speciﬁc rare
resource. This inﬂuences the evaluation of the robustness of the system, which
in case of node failures or when attacked by malicious users should continue to
ensure these features. Furthermore, DISCOS is speciﬁcally designed to result
in a scale-free network to oﬀer good lookup performance, thus opening the path
for speciﬁc attacks aiming at destroying this particular topology or, even more
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important, at exploiting this topology to disrupt the service.
This paper focuses on these aspects by investigating the robustness of the
DISCOS overlay. Both node failures and malicious actions of some participating
peers are considered, in order to analyze how both the overlay topology (and
consequently its lookup performance) and the oﬀered connectivity service are
aﬀected by these events, which may be common in real networks. We introduce
scenarios where peers are selectively removed or where the overlay is under at-
tacks carried out by malicious peers. In particular, we deﬁne a Sybil attack
where malicious peers try to pollute the overlay data with false information.
Our analysis still focuses on a SIP infrastructure, where DISCOS ﬁnds its nat-
ural deployment, and aims at investigating how the described events aﬀect its
operation in terms of connectivity peer lookup performance and media session
failure. Although, in general, the robustness of the original mechanisms is good,
some of the results presented in our analysis have led to the modiﬁcation of such
mechanisms, in order to improve the resulting overlay performance.
The paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst provide some background infor-
mation on the DISCOS architecture (Section 2). Then, we brieﬂy review the
existing works related to the analyzed topic (Section 3), also describing how
DISCOS peculiarities are not completely covered in the available literature on
P2P and scale-free robustness. Section 4 presents our analysis methodology and
provides some information concerning the adopted simulator. Section 5 speciﬁ-
cally discusses the robustness of DISCOS to failures, while Section 6 focuses on
attacks. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 DISCOS Background
DISCOS (DIStributed COnnectivity Service) [2] is an unstructured gossip-based
P2P system for providing connectivity service to nodes with limited connectivity.
The decision to adopt an unstructured network was driven by the purpose of
the overlay, which is devoted to locate one among the many equivalent peers
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oﬀering the service, rather than a speciﬁc rare resource for which a structured
network may be more appropriate [21]. This section provides a brief overview of
DISCOS, ﬁrstly focusing on the selection of the overlay topology (i.e., a scale-
free) and then presenting its operating principles.
2.1 Overlay topology
The DISCOS overlay is designed to result in a scale-free topology. In such
network a few peers called hubs have a high in-degree (i.e., they are known
by many peers), while the others have a low degree and are usually referred
to as leaves. In particular, scale-free graphs are characterized by a power-law
distribution of the node degree, i.e., the probability for a node to have degree k
is given by P (k) = ck−γ , where c and γ are positive constants.
Results presented in [2] show how this overlay topology oﬀers interesting
properties when adopted to provide a connectivity service. First of all, scale
free networks feature a short average path length between nodes, thus ensuring
an adequate spread of information through ﬂooding with limited depth. This is
fundamental in gossip-based overlays to oﬀer good lookup performance together
with limited message overhead on the network. In addition, the topology helps
in reducing the number of connectivity peers queried by the nodes behind NAT
before locating an available servant. Indeed, a connectivity peer already ser-
vicing many nodes simultaneously does not accept further requests and has to
redirect queries to other connectivity peers it knows. Obviously, the larger the
number of known peers, the higher the probability that it can suggest an avail-
able one. However, nodes can only maintain a neighbor cache that should be
kept small in order to reduce the overhead due to its management. This limits
the number of peers known at each instant. [2] describes how a high frequency
in cache update can solve this issue in a scale-free network. Hubs receive a large
number of gossip messages (often called advertisement messages because their
purpose is to advertise the existence of peers in the overlay) as they are the
most popular nodes: if these advertisements contain information about lightly
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loaded peers (i.e., the leaves), hubs will be able to suggest many diﬀerent avail-
able peers during time. If nodes with limited connectivity start querying the
hubs ﬁrst, the number of contacted peers required to locate an available servant
can be signiﬁcantly reduced.
These properties conﬁrm the results obtained by Adamic et al. [22], which
showed how searches in a scale-free topology are extremely scalable and that
searches of speciﬁc content towards hubs perform better than using pure random
walks. DISCOS generalizes these results to the case of a service-oriented overlay
where a single resource (i.e. the relaying/rendezvous functionality) is provided
by many nodes simultaneously.
The described design choices lead the hubs to receive a large portion of the
overall advertisement traﬃc. However, results presented in [2] show that a small
advertisement rate is suﬃcient to achieve high lookup performance. This leads
each node to process no more than 48 messages per minute, which is a negligible
overhead for modern home-PCs. This is obtained thanks to both the type of
service deployed (i.e., the connectivity service, where all peers are equivalent)
and the high availability of possible servants at the hubs.
2.2 Operating principles
When a node connects to the network, it implements a mechanism that deter-
mines if it can become a connectivity peer (i.e., the peer resides into the public
Internet) or it will be a simple client of the overlay. A connectivity peer that
joins the DISCOS overlay for the ﬁrst time will look for a list of active peers
registered into a Boostrap Service and it will update its cache of known peers
with this information. If the Bootstrap Service is unable to provide any active
peer or if the number of peers returned is too low, the joining peer registers itself
in the Bootstrap Service. Entries expire after 60 minutes in order to reduce the
presence of failed or left nodes in the table. If a peer rejoins the overlay after
an oine period, it contacts the Bootstrap Service only if none of the peers it
knows from its last visit is still active.
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The Bootstrap Service is implemented as a set of multiple bootstrap servers
reachable through appropriate DNS SRV entries conﬁgured in the DNS. Each
bootstrap server stores information about some connectivity peers that register
themselves according to the above described policies. Multiple bootstrap servers
are deployed for redundancy and load balancing purposes. [2] also describes how
diﬀerent Bootstrap Services can be used to create disjoint overlays because join-
ing peers that fetch nodes from diﬀerent Bootstrap Services start to exchange
advertisement messages with diﬀerent connectivity peers. This enables the pos-
sibility of deploying diﬀerent DISCOS overlays in diﬀerent geographical areas of
a SIP domain. If a location- aware Bootstrap Service selection policy is adopted
(obtained for example by proper DNS conﬁgurations), users can ﬁnd a connec-
tivity peer that is close to them, thus preserving the user-relay latency achieved
by current centralized solutions, where diﬀerent servers can be used at diﬀerent
locations.
After the bootstrap procedure, the new peer starts sending advertisement
messages to the known peers. This message ﬂooding aims at two purposes: (i)
it allows the sender to announce itself to other peers and (ii) it enables the
sender to share information about the peers in its cache with the rest of the
overlay. The whole overlay is maintained by exchanging these advertisement
messages among peers in this gossip-based fashion.
Some advertisement policies are adopted to create the scale-free topology.
First of all, advertisement messages need to contain highly popular hubs, so that
receiving peers can connect to them and hence favor the scale-free construction.
However, also lightly loaded leaves need to be spread to enable hubs to oﬀer them
to querying users. Hence, advertisement messages include the sender node, the
three most popular peers it knows, and the three less popular peers it knows.
The popularity of a node is computed autonomously by each peer through a
simple approximated metric based on the number of received advertisement
messages that contain such node.
When a peer receives an advertisement message, it updates its cache by
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increasing the popularity of nodes already present and by inserting the new
ones. As previously described, it is important for a node to have both hubs and
lowly popular peers in its cache. Thus, also a proper cache management policy is
adopted if the cache is full: the node with average popularity is removed before
the insertion, resulting in a cache that privileges big hubs and lowly popular
peers.
User nodes with limited connectivity can access the service by locating an
available connectivity peer. When entering the SIP domain, they contact the
Bootstrap Service to obtain some connectivity peers. Then they start a ran-
dom walk search to locate a SIP relay, required to be reachable from the out-
side. Whenever they have to be involved in a media session, they try the hole-
punching procedure using their SIP relay as rendezvous node. If hole-punching
fails, they also have to locate a media relay. In both searches, they direct their
random walks to the most popular nodes they know (generally the hubs) in
order to exploit the scale-free topology.
3 Related work
The robustness to attacks and failures of P2P networks has been extensively
analyzed in literature. The behavior of structured networks under high churn
is studied, for example, in [510], which model the eﬀects of churn on DHTs,
investigate how these reduce their lookup performance, and propose method-
ologies to create structured networks resilient to high churn. On the other
side, [1113] study the negative eﬀect of nodes suddenly leaving unstructured
overlays, also proposing solutions to overcome these limitations. Existing work
on P2P networking properly covers also security aspects: among others, [1420]
analyze several types of threats for P2P overlays, ranging from Sybil to DoS
attacks, propose solutions for peer authentication, and describe methodologies
to improve the security of P2P networks.
Speciﬁc security aspects of P2P overlays for media communications are con-
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sidered in [23, 24]. In particular, these papers deal with possible attacks and
malicious actions in structured overlays designed to decentralize SIP, developed
in the context of the P2PSIP working group [25] in IETF. P2PSIP proposes to
use a DHT to decentralize all the functionalities proper of the SIP protocol, such
as registration and user location. Similarly to DISCOS, P2PSIP also proposes to
integrate rendezvous and relaying functionalities into the user agents. However,
these aspects did not receive particular attention as the P2PSIP work mainly
focused on the decentralization of the SIP proxy and registrar servers. In [26],
one of the IETF-draft on this topic, the authors simply propose for users behind
NAT to perform a connectivity service lookup by randomly selecting a target
key and then exploring the DHT to reach this key: if the node is available, it
will oﬀer the connectivity service to the querying user. Previous publications
on DISCOS [2] also compared the DISCOS scale-free architecture with the ran-
dom exploration of a ﬂat topology, which exactly maps the technique proposed
in [26]. The obtained results showed that the number of peers contacted to ﬁnd
an available relay is sensibly lower in DISCOS than in the structured approach.
Furthermore, the ratio between the performance obtained by the two policies
increases with the network size, thus demonstrating the scalability properties of
the DISCOS architecture. This is not surprising as DISCOS is speciﬁcally de-
signed for oﬀering connectivity service, while the structured solution proposed
in [26] has the main aim of locating speciﬁc resources (i.e., the SIP clients).
Hence, DISCOS is somewhat orthogonal to P2PSIP, which may adopt such
an approach to oﬀer connectivity service in the distributed SIP architecture it
deﬁnes.
The presented studies about the robustness of P2P systems to both churn
and attacks are somehow related to DISCOS due to its P2P nature. However, its
speciﬁc aim and operating principles require the analysis of additional aspects
not covered in these papers. First of all, in DISCOS peers oﬀering the service can
be considered equivalent. Hence, the metric for the overlay performance is the
blocking probability (i.e., the probability for a communication to be blocked
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because none of the many available connectivity peers is found), rather than
the capability of the system to reach arbitrarily rare resources. Furthermore,
we have to consider that DISCOS is thought for a multimedia communication
network, where nodes connect to the system and then remain online for a long
time to exploit the oﬀered services (e.g., make or receive phone calls). Hence,
churn is relatively low and does not aﬀect sensibly the overlay operation. Here
we are mainly interested in node departures due to failure events, when groups
of nodes suddenly leave the overlay, e.g., because of routing or connectivity
problems. Finally, in DISCOS we have to deal with the scale-free topology,
which is the key to oﬀer high lookup performance. Hence, we need speciﬁc
analysis concerning the resilience of this type of network to node failures, as
well as studies about its robustness to attacks speciﬁcally designed to destroy
or exploit this topology.
The robustness of scale-free networks has been analyzed in literature. In
particular, the eﬀect that these events have on the network topology is consid-
ered, pointing out which kind of operations may lead to the network destruction
(i.e., the loss of its scale-free nature and, consequently, of the features of this
topology). [27] compares a scale-free overlay with an exponential network, i.e.,
a network where the probability P (k) that a node of the network is connected
to k other nodes decays exponentially as k grows. The paper shows how ran-
dom deletions of nodes in the exponential network result in a sensible growth
of the diameter with consequent increase of the distance between nodes, while
the scale-free network has been proven to be robust to random node deletion
due to its inhomogeneous nature. In practice, a random node deletion policy
will select mostly leaves and hence it does not have any sensible impact on the
overall topology. However, results change signiﬁcantly when nodes are removed
in decreasing order of degree. While the behavior of the exponential network re-
mains almost the same, in the case of the scale free network the diameter grows
rapidly, doubling the values obtained in the previous experiment when just 5%
of the nodes were removed. This leads to the conclusion that scale-free networks
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are sensible to hub failures and attacks explicitly targeted to hub jeopardizing.
These results are conﬁrmed by [28, 29], which further investigate the scale-free
behavior when node are deleted randomly or in decreasing order of degree. [28]
proves that the fraction of nodes that have to be randomly removed in order to
disrupt a scale-free network with γ = 2.5 is greater than 0.99, while [29] esti-
mates the critical fraction of hubs that must be removed to make the scale-free
network collapse.
The limitation of these studies is that they all consider static (or quasi-
static) scale-free networks where nodes, once joined the network, neither leave
nor change their neighbors. On the contrary, DISCOS is a dynamic infrastruc-
ture where peers join and leave the overlay during time. In addition to that, the
gossip-based mechanism used for the overlay maintenance provides the capabil-
ity to create links between peers dynamically, thus enabling the topology to be
updated during time. For this reason, we expect DISCOS to be more robust
than a static scale-free network.
This paper focuses on the robustness of the DISCOS overlay and conse-
quently brings a double contribution to the existing work. First of all, it ex-
tends the results available in literature about the robustness of P2P networks
by analyzing how node failures and attacks aﬀect the achieved blocking prob-
ability, which is the performance metric of interest in an overlay designed to
support media communications as peers can be considered equivalent. Second,
it extends the robustness analysis of scale-free networks presented in [2729] by
considering both the dynamicity of the network and attacks speciﬁcally designed
to compromise a service oﬀered over this topology.
4 Analysis presentation and background
This section introduces and gives some background information on the robust-
ness analysis operated on the DISCOS overlay, which investigates by simulation
the DISCOS behavior when failures occur or when some peers attack the overlay
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trying to corrupt the information stored in the caches of the other peers. This
study is carried out using an ad-hoc simulator implementing DISCOS. Details
on the simulator and on some parameters adopted are given in Section 4.2.
4.1 Robustness analysis overview
Given the importance of the scale-free topology for the proper operation of
DISCOS, our analysis starts from the investigation of the consequences that
failures and attacks may have on the overlay topology. We need to verify that
the network both maintains its scale-free topology and is not partitioned into
isolated clusters, thus making some connectivity peers mutually unreachable
(i.e., when a lookup starts at a connectivity peer and there are other peers that
cannot be reached through the information stored in the caches of such peer
and its neighbors). This may be deleterious for nodes with limited connectivity,
which then are no longer able to propagate their service requests to connectivity
peers in separated clusters and consequently see the portion of the network
they can explore to ﬁnd an available servant to be sensibly reduced. The latter
evaluation is performed by measuring the number of disjoint clusters generated
by failure events.
In addition to that, we evaluate the DISCOS eﬀectiveness in quickly locating
reliable connectivity peers, which is directly connected to the maintenance of
the scale-free topology. In particular, we measure the number of peers contacted
to locate an available connectivity peer and the average call blocking probability
due to a fail in locating an available peer. We compare these results with the
ones obtained during normal operation (i.e., without failures and attacks). The
location of both SIP and media relays is considered.
Our analysis concerning the robustness of DISCOS to failures (presented
in Section 5) considers node deletions, similarly to the existing literature on
scale-free networks described in the previous section, as well as failures of the
Bootstrap Service, which is the key component to allow peers to join the overlay.
Furthermore, Section 6 investigates the behavior of DISCOS when attacked by
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some malicious nodes. In particular, we deﬁne and analyze an attack aiming at
disrupting the oﬀered service.
4.2 Simulation background
We developed a custom, event-driven simulator implementing DISCOS. This
supports the following four operations: node arrival/departure, media session set
up/teardown, SIP relay lookup (triggered when a node with limited connectivity
joins the network), and media relay lookup (that occurs when a node requires
a relay to perform a media session). In addition to that, we deﬁned some
events speciﬁcally designated for our robustness study: failure events of both
some nodes and the Bootstrap Service and the arrival of malicious nodes whose
operation diﬀers from the traditional one as their aim is to attack the DISCOS
overlay.
According to [30], about 74% of Internet hosts are placed behind a NAT.
In [1] it has been estimated that 20% of the sessions involving such hosts requires
a relay, otherwise the communication is not possible. These data are used to
determine the percentage of nodes involved in the DISCOS overlay and the
amount of sessions requiring a media relay lookup. In essence, a node joining
the SIP domain is labeled as behind NAT with probability pnat = 0.74 and
as connectivity peer joining the DISCOS overlay with probability pcp = 0.26.
Furthermore, whenever a media session occurs, we label it as requiring a media
relay with probability pmr = 0.2.
Node lifetime and call length distributions are obtained empirically after an-
alyzing Skype traﬃc coming from/to the network of the University campus [31].
Node arrivals are modeled using a Poisson process with average arrival rate of
100 nodes per minute that, in conjunction with the Skype node lifetime distri-
bution, results in a SIP domain population of about 30000 nodes in the steady
state. This population guarantees the signiﬁcance of the obtained results and
meets our memory and CPU constraints. We also adopted Poisson distributed
call occurrences with an average rate of 2000 sessions per minute. This value,
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coupled with the Skype call length distribution, leads to about 98% of nodes
simultaneously involved in a media session. This allows us to analyze the be-
havior of the architecture in a worst case scenario. The simulated time is ﬁxed
to ten days, which allows us to analyze the network in the steady state (reached
after about 1.5 days).
The Bootstrap Service is modeled as a single well-known node capable to
store information related to 20 peers of the overlay. Vice versa, according to
deﬁnitions provided in [2], peers in the overlay deploy a cache capable to contain
up to 10 entries and peers sent advertisement messages every 60 minutes using
a TTL equal to 2, meaning the ﬂooding depth is limited to 2 hops. [2] shows
how these parameters guarantee good performance together with reasonable
overhead on the network.
5 Failures of peers and Bootstrap Service
This section studies how DISCOS reacts to failure events. Two diﬀerent failures
are analyzed: a failure at some peers in the overlay which makes them suddenly
unavailable1 and a failure at the Bootstrap Service which causes its reset and
the consequent impossibility for new joining peers to enter the network.
5.1 Eﬀects of failures on the scale-free topology
We ﬁrst investigate the eﬀect of node failures. Since scale-free networks are
known to be resilient to random perturbations [27,28], we focus on hub failures.
The reason for such an analysis is that hubs disappear only seldom, but the
eﬀect of their failure might be catastrophic for the whole overlay because of
their crucial role. However, we also have to consider that the dynamic nature of
the DISCOS overlay, where nodes join and leave the system, oﬀers opportunities
1Node departures could have similar eﬀects. However, as highlighted in Section 3, the
relatively low churn-rate characterizing VoIP networks reduces the signiﬁcance of these events
that, as implicitly shown in [2], do not aﬀect the overlay operation. Therefore, we prefer to
explicitly refer to node failures, which are the unpredictable events that could actually aﬀect
the DISCOS performance.
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for recovering from hub failures that do not exist in the static scale-free networks
studied so far [27, 28]. Therefore, another goal of this analysis is to investigate
the healing capabilities of DISCOS, which may be powerful even under these
critical failure patterns.
The analysis is performed by periodically removing the most popular nodes
in the overlay in order to try to destroy the network. To determine which peers
must be deleted, peers are ﬁrst sorted by decreasing degree values, then the
most popular ones are dropped from the overlay. We consider three simulation
scenarios, characterized by the removal of the 1%, 5%, and 10% most popular
nodes at each failure event. We select these values because are comparable to
the values that [29] identiﬁed as able to destroy a static scale-free network.
Figure 2 plots the average in-degree distribution registered on the overlay
when hub removal events periodically occur. This ﬁgure do not consider overlay
partitioning, which is however discussed in the next section. Simulation results
show how these percentages of hub failures do not aﬀect the scale-free character-
istic of the overlay. This is a major advantage of DISCOS with respect to static
scale-free networks and shows how, although the overlay may degrade after the
single hub removal event, peers are able to restore the original topology thanks
to the advertisement messages exchanged to share the overlay knowledge: they
continue to evaluate node popularity and start to favor connections to the most
popular nodes survived, which further increase their popularity and become the
new hubs.
Analogous considerations may be done for the failure of the Bootstrap Ser-
vice. Concerning this failure event, we prefer to analyze a reset of the Bootstrap
Service instead of making it temporarily unavailable. This is done because if
the Bootstrap Service is unreachable for a while and a peer joins the overlay for
the ﬁrst time, the peer keeps on trying to access the Bootstrap Service until it is
successful, without introducing signiﬁcant changes in the overlay behavior. On
the contrary, if the joining peer ﬁnds the Bootstrap Service empty after a reset,
it registers itself into the Bootstrap Service and does not connect to anyone
15
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Figure 2: Average in-degree distribution during time: (a) DISCOS normal op-
eration; (b) failure of the 1% most popular nodes; (c) failure of the 5% most
popular nodes; (d) failure of the 10% most popular nodes; (e) Bootstrap Service
reset. The dotted line is a power-law distribution P (k) = 0.7k−1.5.
else, thus potentially modifying the overlay topology. Figure 2(e) shows how
the overlay rewiring in DISCOS maintains the scale-free topology also in this
case.
5.2 Overlay partitioning
While Figure 2 conﬁrms the maintenance of the scale-free topology, it does not
consider if the original overlay breaks into multiple separated clusters of nodes
after failures.
In the case of hub removals, multiple disconnected sub-graphs may come
up after the deletion. This is due to the fact that, being hubs so popular, the
remaining peers can reach each other thanks to the hubs they know. When the
hubs are eliminated, a node may not be able to send advertisement messages to
other peers, since they are part of separated clusters. Separated clusters may be
originated also after a Bootstrap Service reset. In fact, peers arriving just after
the reset event have the perception to be the ﬁrst nodes of the overlay and do
not have the chance to connect to anyone else already present. This potentially
triggers the creation of a new overlay.
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Table 1: Overlay partitioning
Failure Max number Max overlay
event of components reconnection time
1% of nodes 1 -
5% of nodes 2 53 min
10% of nodes 7 164 min
Bootstrap Service 2 753 min
Bootstrap Service∗ 2 98 min
Concerning the failures of nodes, simulation results show that only the dele-
tion of a remarkable fraction of hubs causes relevant fragmentation. Indeed,
no overlay partitioning is observed when 1% of nodes are removed, while the
creation of no more than two separated clusters is observed when failure events
remove 5% of nodes simultaneously. Finally, we observed the creation of at
most 7 components when 10% of nodes are removed at the same time. The
overlay reconnects within diﬀerent time bounds thanks to the joining of both
new peers and peers that have already been part of the overlay in the past.
As we described in Section 2, the former contact the Bootstrap Server when
joining, while the latter try to connect ﬁrst to peers they have in their cache.
Hence, if in the Bootstrap Service or in the cache of rejoining peers there are two
or more peers being part of diﬀerent clusters, these can reconnect in a unique
component. Results about both the maximum number of observed clusters and
the maximum amount of time necessary to observe again a unique network are
summarized in Table 1.
The overlay behavior after a Bootstrap Service reset is analyzed by simu-
lating a single reset after the steady state is reached. As expected, after the
Bootstrap Service reset the overlay breaks in two components. In this case, the
action of rejoining peers is of little help because most of the peers of the second
overlay have joined DISCOS after the failure event. Only a particular event can
reconnect the two components: a rejoining peer that has in its cache another
peer which previously rejoined to DISCOS and for some reason (e.g., peers it
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knew were no longer in the network) is in the new overlay; this happens only
seldom, as conﬁrmed by the maximum overlay reconnection time reported in
Table 1. This result suggests that some modiﬁcation should be introduced in
the original DISCOS mechanisms to improve this speciﬁc aspect. In particular,
to ensure a faster overlay reconnection, we modiﬁed the behavior of peers that
join the overlay multiple times. When such peers rejoin the overlay, they do not
only reconnect to the active peers they discovered before leaving, but also check
the Bootstrap Service to get other peers in the overlay. In this way, rejoining
peers are able to know peers in both the components: indeed they know some
peers of the original overlay (the ones already in their cache) and new peers that
are part of the new component (the ones they got from the Bootstrap Service).
This simple modiﬁcation reduces the maximum overlay reconnection time to
less than 100 minutes, as reported in the bottom row of Table 1 (identiﬁed with
an asterisk symbol).
5.3 Blocking Probability
The modiﬁcation of the overlay topology and the partitioning of the network
in disjoint clusters have a direct impact on the blocking probability (i.e., the
probability for a user with limited connectivity to fail in locating an available
relay) achieved in the DISCOS overlay, which can be considered the performance
metric of real interest in our analysis as its degradation is directly perceived by
users: when a lookup fails, they cannot be involved in media sessions or even
join the SIP domain.
The results of the lookup performance analysis on the DISCOS overlay con-
ﬁrm what has been observed during the previous tests: the eﬀects of the dis-
cussed failures do not have a relevant impact on the overlay behavior. We did
not observe any signiﬁcant modiﬁcation of the blocking probability when the
1% and the 5% most popular peers are removed from the overlay, as well as
when the Bootstrap Service fails. Instead, the average number of peers that a
node needs to contact for locating an available SIP relay (evaluated along the
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entire simulation) experiences a maximum of 3% growth (from 2.06 peers to
2.12 peers) when the 10% most popular peers are periodically removed from the
overlay. These events have even minor impact on the location of media relays,
which are required by a smaller portion of users. This conﬁrms the robustness
of DISCOS, which, thanks to its dynamic nature, can reconstruct the original
scale-free topology (hence providing high lookup performance) even after serious
failure events.
6 Attack analysis
This section investigates the behavior of DISCOS when malicious peers attack
the overlay. Concerning the possible attacks, we can distinguish between actions
aiming at disrupting the scale-free topology of the overlay and actions aiming
at disrupting the service itself. The ﬁrst type of attack includes the attempt
by malicious peers to isolate some hubs, as well as actions aiming at destroying
the scale-free topology of the overlay. From the point of view of this work, the
former can be considered equivalent to the deletion of some hubs, which has been
discussed in the previous section. Instead, the latter is eﬀective only if a high
percentage of peers are malicious. Since DISCOS is a closed overlay where all
participating peers have to be part of a SIP domain, and hence are authenticated
and controlled, this event is unlikely to occur. Hence, we focus on attacks aiming
at disrupting the service, i.e., attacks where malicious peers do not attempt to
modify the scale-free topology, but try to spread fake advertisement messages
including peers that do not oﬀer the service. In particular, we deﬁne an ad-hoc
Sybil attack that is expected to make the overlay ineﬃcient if successful.
6.1 Attack overview
According to [32], a Sybil attack consists in forging a large number of false
identities and in using them to gain inﬂuence in the overlay. When applied to
DISCOS, this consists in propagating the information related to some malicious
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Figure 3: Average in-degree distribution computed during time: (a) DISCOS
normal operation; (b) 5% of malicious peers; (c) 10% of malicious peers; (d) 30%
of malicious peers. The dotted line is a power-law distribution P (k) = 0.7k−1.5.
nodes across the overlay, so that they can gain the reputation of hubs. The
attack is successful if malicious nodes replace the original hubs and return other
malicious peers when queried for service. Indeed, this may result in lookup
performance loss or even in lookup failures as in DISCOS lookups are directed
to hubs with high probability.
Speciﬁcally, the attack consists in trying to push the popularity of a restricted
number of malicious peers that we call black-hole peers, in order to replace
hubs with them. When queried for the service, the black-hole peers answer
negatively and suggest only other black-hole peers as search alternatives. To
make the popularity of black-hole peers growing fast, they are designed to stay
in the overlay forever and are supported by malicious peers that join the overlay
and start announcing them instead of adopting the advertisement strategy de-
ﬁned for DISCOS. By doing this, it is possible to poison the caches of the peers
in the overlay, making them believe that the black-hole peers are hubs. Hence,
also the poisoned peers start announcing the black-hole peers, thus further
propagating the overlay corruption. We also assume malicious nodes to know
the lifetime of entries in the Bootstrap Service, which is constant and equal to
60 minutes, as described in Section 2. This is a realistic assumption (malicious
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nodes can cooperate in collecting statistics to estimate this value with reason-
able accuracy) and allows malicious peers to further increase the eﬀectiveness
of their attack: malicious peers try to re-register themselves on the Bootstrap
Service when their entries are elapsing, thus potentially leading the Bootstrap
Service to be entirely populated of attackers; these are then communicated to
new users, which hence result poisoned since the beginning of their activity in
the overlay.
During simulation, we assume that 30 black-hole peers are present in the
overlay, i.e., 0.1% of the overlay population. This value is comparable to the
percentage of highly popular nodes (i.e., whose in-degree is close to 100) present
in the overlay during normal operation, as can be observed in Figure 3(a). This
is done to eﬀectively poison the overlay, which potentially replaces all ordinary
hubs with these black-hole nodes. Furthermore, we consider three diﬀerent
percentages of malicious peers announcing black-hole nodes, namely, 5%, 10%
and 30% of the overall overlay population.
The eﬀect of the attack on both the overlay topology and the blocking prob-
ability is analyzed in the following. Unlike the failure analysis, overlay parti-
tioning is not considered in this case as there is no reason for this type of attack
to generate separated clusters.
6.2 Overlay topology
Although the attack is not designed to destroy scale-free networks, the behav-
ior of malicious peers may have negative eﬀects on the overlay topology, thus
causing a decrease in the DISCOS performance. Figure 3 portrays the weighted
mean of the in-degree distributions related to normal operation, compared to the
distributions obtained assuming the above mentioned percentages of malicious
peers announcing black-hole nodes (i.e., 5%, 10% and 30% of the overall over-
lay population). The ﬁgure shows how the in-degree distribution changes due
to the attack. It can be seen that one peak is present in correspondence of large
in-degree values, which grows proportionally to the number of attackers. This
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can be motivated with the abnormally large popularity of black-hole peers,
which is obtained by pushing black-hole peers popularity through the overlay
in conjunction with their inﬁnite lifetime. However, we can argue that the over-
lay topology slightly changes and can still be considered a good approximation
of a scale-free network.
6.3 Blocking probability
Although the topology is not sensibly aﬀected, the DISCOS operation is vul-
nerable to the presented Sybil attack. In fact, cache poisoning leads nodes to
know, announce, and contact malicious and black hole peers with high proba-
bility, potentially only these nodes. This is conﬁrmed by the sensible worsening
we observed in the lookup performance: after a few hundreds of minutes from
the beginning of the attack, only about 20% of users with limited connectivity
can locate a SIP relay when entering the SIP domain, while the call blocking
probability (i.e., the probability for an incoming call requiring a media relay
to be rejected because the system fails in locating the relay) assumes values
close to 1 even when the percentage of malicious peers is only 5% of the over-
lay population. This is clearly due to the behavior of the black-hole peers,
which do not provide the required service and announce only other black-hole
nodes. Consequently, nodes with limited connectivity keep on searching until
an available servant is found.
To prevent this performance decrease, we slightly modiﬁed the operation of
the Bootstrap Service: instead of deregistering peers after a ﬁxed entry lifetime
of 60 minutes (we remember the reader that this value is constant in the current
version of DISCOS), the Bootstrap Service adopts a statistical process to deter-
mine the deletion time, so that there is no way for malicious nodes to estimate
the lifetime of their entry and, consequently, to force their re-registration when
the lifetime elapses. To circumvent this countermeasure, malicious peers could
poll the Bootstrap Service at high rate in order to increase their probability
to be registered. However, this can be avoided by deploying simple techniques
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based on well-known anti-DoS solutions. Hence, it is not considered in this
paper.
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Figure 4 shows the average number of contacted peers to locate a relay when
the abovementioned Bootstrap Service operation is introduced in the network. It
can be observed how this Bootstrap Service modiﬁcation leads SIP relay lookups
to undergo negligible eﬀects due to attacks. The performance of media relay
lookups is sensibly improved, as well. In fact, the average number of contacted
peers to locate a media relay experiences a signiﬁcant growth (reaching a value
greater than 9) only when the attackers are 30% of the overall population.
This situation is unlikely to verify in real networks, as it would require the
involvement of a large number of nodes.
These results regards the average complexity of relay lookups, but it is im-
portant to investigate also how this Bootstrap Service modiﬁcation impacts on
the call failure probability, i.e., the probability for a relayed call to be refused as
the system cannot ﬁnd a media relay. Figure 5 plots the call failure probability
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for diﬀerent percentages of malicious peers in the overlay. Again, we observe a
signiﬁcant growth (from about 0.03 to about 0.22) only when 30% of peers are
malicious.
This performance improvement is due to the modiﬁed operation of the Boot-
strap Service, which now is able to oﬀer non-malicious nodes to incoming users,
thus reducing cache poisoning and hence contrasting the action of malicious
peers. In particular, we observed above how SIP relay lookups are almost unaf-
fected by attacks with this Bootstrap Service modiﬁcation. In fact, since users
perform SIP relay lookups as soon as they enter the SIP domain, this modiﬁ-
cation allows them to base SIP relay searches on the non-malicious nodes just
retrieved from the Bootstrap Service.
7 Conclusion
Overlays for media communication have been receiving an increasing interest
due to their potential to avoid scalability issues of centralized solutions. In
particular, the DIStributed COnnectivity Service (DISCOS) architecture dis-
tributes rendezvous and relay functionalities among peers in order to oﬀer con-
nectivity service (i.e., NAT traversal functionalities) to the users of a SIP do-
main. Previous work on DISCOS covered aspects related to its overlay topology
and operating principles, showing how a gossip-based unstructured overlay re-
sulting in a scale-free network oﬀers high performance and eﬃciency. This work,
instead, focuses on the robustness of DISCOS to failures and attacks.
We considered diﬀerent failure rates of the participating peers, as well as
the possible failure of the Bootstrap Service (a system supporting node joining
in DISCOS). Furthermore, we deﬁned a Sybil attack aiming at disrupting the
oﬀered connectivity service.
Although our analysis demonstrated the overall robustness of the system, it
also highlighted two critical points. First, we observed a signiﬁcant decrease of
the overlay performance when the system is under attack. Second, we noticed
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that the failure of the Bootstrap Service may lead the overlay to partition in
separated clusters, with consequent lookup performance decrease. However,
our simulation results showed how slight modiﬁcations of the Bootstrap Service
operation and the peer joining process solve this issue and allow DISCOS to
oﬀer reasonable performance also in presence of these critical events.
The paper also shows how the dynamicity of nodes improves the robustness of
scale-free networks. In fact, unlike its static counterpart, the DISCOS dynamic
scale-free overlay is robust also to hub deletions. This result has a more general
value and may be of interest in other contexts where scale-free networks cover
an important role, as well.
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